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E
xchange rate pegs collapsed in many coun-
tries in the 1990s, leading to dreary assess-
ments of the merits of pegged exchange rate
regimes. Whether one points to the failure of
Mexico’s peg in December 1994 or to the sharp
devaluations in East Asia in 1997-98, in Russia in
August 1998, and in Brazil in January 1999, the
collapse of unilateral exchange rate pegs often
preceded acute financial and macroeconomic
crises. Despite recent failures, however, exchange
rate pegs remain a prevalent policy choice. Calvo
and Reinhart (2000) argue that the exchange rate
volatility that accompanies a floating exchange rate
regime is particularly onerous to emerging markets,
and thus can be a worse policy choice than a peg
that reduces the variability of the exchange rate,
even if it does not attain the complete confidence
of investors. Given the continued prevalence of
pegs, it is worth seeking additional understanding
of what makes a peg successful or not.
For this reason, we find it useful to study what
was arguably the most successful unilateral
exchange rate peg: Austria’s peg to the Deutsche
mark prior to Austria’s entry into the European
Monetary System in 1995. An estimated model of
Austrian monetary policy mechanics helps identify
salient features that made the Austrian peg credible
to the public. We then apply the same model to
monetary policy in Thailand: among the East Asian
countries that eventually devalued, Thailand had
maintained the tightest peg to the U.S. dollar prior
to July 1997. The conventional wisdom is that the
currency crisis in Thailand came without warning
and caught financial markets by surprise (Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini, 1999, and Halcomb and
Marshall, 2000). We investigate whether there were
any contrasts between the Austrian and Thai pegs
that would have hinted at problems for Thailand
prior to July 1997.
The next section discusses alternative exchange
rate regimes to put the unilateral peg in context. The
third section presents an empirical model of mone-
tary policy to describe the mechanics with which
Austria pegged its exchange rate. The fourth section
applies the same model to describe Thailand’s
monetary policy and the contrast with Austria.
ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE
REGIMES
As a prelude to an analysis of the mechanics
of a unilateral exchange rate peg, it is useful to
describe the spectrum of alternative exchange rate
regimes. In addition to unilateral exchange rate
pegs, there are five other exchange rate regimes: a
floating rate (including managed floats), multilateral
exchange rate pegs, currency boards, dollarization,
and currency union. We describe here where the
unilateral peg lies along the spectrum. Since the
end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates in 1973, floating exchange rates have displayed
a very high degree of variability without a corre-
sponding increase in the variability of exchange rate
fundamentals (Flood and Rose, 1999). Moreover,
Hausmann, Panniza, and Stein (1999) have shown
that emerging markets in Latin America that have
attempted to allow their exchange rates to float have
experienced greater interest rate volatility than
fixed-rate regimes. For this reason, Calvo and
Reinhart (2000) argue that floating exchange rates
can have destabilizing effects on emerging markets.
For the next four regimes—all variants of fixed
exchange rates—we start with the type of fixed rate
that is closest to a float and move along the spec-
trum from there. In the first three regimes, a home
country unilaterally fixes its currency to an “anchor”
currency. The unilateral nature of the regime implies
that the anchor country is not obligated to assist
the home country if its currency comes under
speculative attack. In a pegged regime, it is incum-
bent on the pegging country to set a monetary
policy that always appears to currency traders to
be consistent with the preannounced conversion
rate. The best way to uphold this commitment is to
run a monetary policy that is similar to that in the
anchor country in terms of inflation rates and credit
expansion. A pegging regime is more resistant to
speculative attack if banks and other institutions
hold an amount of foreign-exchange reserves that
is at least as great as the quantity of short-term debt
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for example, was largely immune to the Asian crisis
of 1997-98 due to its large holdings of foreign
exchange reserves. Many other emerging markets,
however, intend to be net borrowers in foreign cur-
rencies, and they attract foreign lending by estab-
lishing a peg and promising a stable exchange rate.
The best way to keep this promise is to run a mon-
etary policy that closely mimics that of the anchor
country. 
A currency board differs from a unilateral peg
in that the home country no longer sets its own
monetary policy. Instead, the size of the monetary
base is determined by monetary policy in the anchor
country and capital flows. The currency board
arrangement leaves no room for policies that are
inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate because
the only policy is a commitment to adjust the mone-
tary base in tandem with flows of foreign exchange
reserves in and out of the central bank. As a conse-
quence, the home country’s central bank can no
longer act as a lender of last resort to the domestic
banking sector; thus, speculative attacks can take
place against banks instead of the currency.
Dollarization represents the unilateral decision
to enact two formal changes.1 The first change is
that all local currency in circulation plus vault cash
in banks is redeemed for U.S. dollars at some
announced conversion rate and is then destroyed.
The second change involves transforming all con-
tracts denominated in local currency into contracts
in U.S. dollars at the conversion rate. Dollarization,
which has recently taken place in Ecuador, has
received increasing attention in academic and policy
circles.
Exchange rates can also be fixed through multi-
lateral arrangements, although these require more
coordination and negotiation than unilateral pegs.
Two multilateral systems are multilateral pegs and
currency unions. In a multilateral peg, the distinc-
tion between the anchor currency and the pegging
currency becomes blurred because the participating
countries are obligated to take monetary policy
measures to defend the exchange rate peg. The
prime example of a multilateral peg is the European
Monetary System prior to the adoption of a single
currency in January 1999. A currency union, in
contrast, consists of an agreement to merge several
currencies to fix the exchange rates and unify their
monetary policymaking permanently. The European
Monetary Union, undertaken in 1999, is the most
prominent currency union.
A MODEL OF MONETARY POLICY
MECHANICS FOR A UNILATERAL PEG
In practice, nearly all central banks implement
monetary policy by setting a short-term interest
rate as a policy instrument. A central bank trying
to maintain an exchange rate peg will focus on the
interest rate differential between the short-term
rate in its domestic currency and the prevailing
short-term rate in the anchor currency. If the home
currency comes under selling pressure, an increase
in the interest rate differential can attract buyers
by convincing them that higher domestic interest
rates will keep domestic inflation in check, prevent
a devaluation, and result in excess returns to the
domestic currency relative to the anchor currency.
In the long run, the pegging central bank must
keep domestic inflation rates close to inflation in
the anchor currency. By harmonizing the inflation
rates, the central bank prevents the real exchange
rate from appreciating to unsustainable levels at
the pegged nominal exchange rate. Speculators often
bet that central banks that have allowed substantial
appreciation of the real exchange rate through rel-
atively high domestic inflation will choose to break
the peg and devalue, rather than let the domestic
economy stagnate for a prolonged period with a
high, uncompetitive real exchange rate.
We preface our presentation of a model of
monetary policy mechanics by noting that monetary
policy decisions do not strictly obey a particular
formula or equation. Nevertheless, central banks do
not have to implement in a literal fashion a model
of monetary policy for the model to be useful. In
fact, central banks often monitor such models them-
selves because these models provide useful informa-
tion about the rate of inflation that is likely to result
from recent policy decisions.
In our empirical model of monetary policy
mechanics, we assume that a pegging central bank
adjusts the policy instrument, i (the interest rate
differential), according to a forecast of the relation-
ship between the policy instrument and domestic
price inflation, π:
(1)
where π0t is the desired inflation rate, which is pre-
sumably close to the rate of inflation expected in
the anchor currency. Note that this use of a forecast
∆Ε ∆ ii t tt tt t =+ [] − −1 0 ππ ,
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1 The term dollarization pertains to adopting the U.S. dollar; however,
another major currency could be adopted as well.to choose the policy instrument setting is analogous
to setting a money-supply instrument, m in logs,
according to a velocity forecast:
(2)
where y is nominal gross domestic product (GDP)
in logs and ∆y0t is the desired rate of nominal GDP
growth at time t. One difference is that, in the latter
formulation, the forecasted quantity, ∆y–∆m, is a
well-known relation (velocity growth), whereas in
the former the forecasted quantity, ∆i+π is not.2
In either case, if policy is set according to the fore-
cast and the forecast is correct on average, then the
desired inflation or nominal GDP growth rate will
be achieved on average.3
For a pegging central bank, we add to equation
(1) two feedback terms that indicate the response
to an exchange rate gap and an inflation gap. The
exchange rate gap, (e–e ∼), is between the actual and
target exchange rate. The inflation gap, (π–π
f), is
between inflation in the home country and the
anchor country:
(3)
Not all of these feedback terms will be significant
for both Austria and Thailand, but we estimated
identical models for both countries to highlight the
differences between their policies and not different
models of policy. An error term ε is added to equa-
tion (3) to indicate that no central bank follows
such an interest rate rule perfectly. In practice, we
assume the error term has a Student t distribution
with n degrees of freedom to allow for occasions
of large deviations between the actual and model-
implied policy settings. The coefficients λ1 and λ2
indicate to what degree the respective gaps alter this
period’s desired rate of inflation from the baseline
level of π0.
The model of monetary policy must infer a
target value of the exchange rate because central
banks allow even strongly pegged exchange rates
to drift a bit over long periods of time, and they do
not announce precisely the extent to which the
exchange rate target has incorporated this drift. In
this model, the implicit target exchange rate that
appears in the exchange-rate gap in equation (3) is
a weighted average of last period’s target and last
period’s actual rate (in logs):
∆Ε ∆ ii
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(4) .
Gradual rebasing of the target occurs for values of
δ less than one. Small shifts in the exchange rate
are gradually accommodated into the target rate. As
δ decreases from one, the rate of accommodation
increases. Because δ is an estimated parameter, the
model infers a path for the exchange rate target that
best explains the central bank’s policy responses
as measured by interest rate adjustments.
Applying the Model to Austria’s Peg
In order to use this model as a device to describe
monetary policy mechanics over a relatively long
sample period, it is realistic to allow some of the
parameters to vary across time. Therefore, we make
several parameters subject to two-state Markov
switching, which is a parsimonious way to introduce
variation into the parameter values. For example,
even if Austria were to harmonize its intended infla-
tion rate with Germany’s, we would not expect
Austria’s baseline inflation, π0, to be constant over
the entire sample period. The German Bundesbank’s
informal inflation target varied between 4.5 and 2
percent (or less) between 1975 and 1994, according
to von Hagen (1995). Thus, we can expect that esti-
mates of π0 for Austria will switch between two
values that lie roughly in this range. Other param-
eters are not expected to remain absolutely constant
across the entire sample either. For example, the
exchange rate target will sometimes be nearly
constant, (δ=1), whereas at other times it will adjust
to accommodate changes in the prevailing exchange
rate, (δ<1). Markov switching is a method that lets
economists use the data and model to infer when
parameter shifts occurred, rather than impose their
own judgment. Also subject to switching are the
feedback parameters, λ1 and λ2, and the variance,
σ
2. We use three different binary Markov state vari-
ables, S1, S2, and S3, with transition probabilities,
(pi, qi), i=1,2,3, where pi=Prob(Sit=0|Sit–1=0)
and qi=Prob(Sit=1|Sit–1=1).4 The first state vari-
able governs switching in π0. The second governs
switching in the feedback parameters λ1, λ2, and δ.
˜˜ ee e tt t =+ − () −− δδ 11 1
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2 An equivalent set-up to equation (1) would be to forecast ∆i+∆π to
target the change in inflation as π0t–πt–1.
3 Dueker and Fischer (1998) discuss the forecasting of the ratio
between the nominal target variable and the policy instrument.
4 Technical details regarding the estimation procedure are in the
Appendix and Dueker and Fischer (1996).The third governs switching in σ
2, the variance of
the error term. A more parsimonious model would
tie all of these parameters to a single state variable,
but it seems too restrictive to force the inflation
target to move in tandem with the rebasing of the
exchange rate target.
The data used to estimate the model are short-
term interest rates and inflation rates for Austria
and Germany, as well as the exchange rate between
the Austrian schilling and the Deutsche mark. We
use the three-month repurchase rates for Austria
and Germany, which are the most representative
short-term interest rates. The consumer price index
(CPI) is the inflation measure. Our sample consists
of quarterly data from 1972 to the end of 1994.
On January 1, 1995, Austria officially entered the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System, whereupon the exchange rate
became part of a multilateral peg.5 Discussion of the
construction of the forecasts, Et|t–1[∆it+πt], and the
likelihood function is included in the Appendix.
Parameter estimates for Austria from 1972:Q2
through 1994:Q3 are in Table 1, where subscripts
a and b denote the pair of values of parameters
subject to Markov switching. The a values corre-
spond with the p transition probabilities, and the
b values correspond with the q transition probabili-
ties. Parameter values reported as equal to either
zero or one converged arbitrarily close to those
values and were not restricted in the estimation.
The estimates of Austria’s baseline inflation
rates, π0a,b=(1.74, 3.49), from Table 1 are quite close
to the range of Germany’s informal inflation targets
of 4.5 to 2 percent or less.6 The unconditional value
of Austria’s π0 is 2.89. We call π0 a baseline inflation
rate because it would be the inflation target if both
the exchange rate gap and the inflation gap were
zero. To assess further whether Austrian monetary
policy was aiming at a common rate of inflation with
Germany, we estimated equation (3) for Germany,
with the feedback coefficients λ1 and λ2 set to zero.
The estimates of π0a,b for Germany are (0.71, 3.50),
with an unconditional value of 2.86, which is
extremely close to Austria’s 2.89. Thus, Austria’s
monetary policymakers revealed through their
interest rate instrument settings a preference for
the same inflation rate as that of Germany, even in
the absence of feedback from the exchange rate
and inflation gaps.
Figure 1 shows a plot of the probability-weighted
values of π0 for Austria and Germany and shows a
high degree of correspondence between the two.
Austria’s period-by-period inflation target, condi-





5 From 1974 to 1995, the Austrian National Bank unilaterally pegged
the Austrian schilling to the Deutsche mark. This policy was known
as the “hard-currency policy.” Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) discuss
this policy regime in detail.
6 These results are presented in detail in Dueker and Fischer (2000).
Figure 1
Inflation Targets







Austria’s Model-Implied Inflation Target  
Without Feedback from Gaps
Germany’s Model-Implied Inflation Target
Percent
Table 1
Parameter Estimates for Austria
π0a,b 1.740 (0.612) 3.494 (0.304)
λ 1a,b 00
p1, q1 0.887 (0.087) 0.941 (0.048)
λ 2a,b 1.124 (0.105) 0.338 (0.091)
δa,b 1 0.823 (0.084)
p2, q2 0.231 (0.269) 0.743 (0.174)
σ
2
a,b 0.057 (0.028) 2.121 (1.074)
p3, q3 0.948 (0.041) 0.931 (0.578)
1/n 0.199 (0.161)
Log-likelihood –115.9
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses; p1, q1 are transition
probabilities for switching in π0; p2, q2 are transition probabili-
ties for switching in λ1, λ2, δ; p3, q3 are transition probabilities
for switching in σ
2.Since λ1 equals zero in both states, Austria’s
monetary policy took feedback from the exchange
rate only. One conclusion we can draw is that strong
feedback from the inflation gap is not necessary
for a peg to succeed, provided that the pegging
country has chosen the same baseline inflation
rates, π0, as the anchor country. 
Figure 2 shows Austria’s period-by-period infla-
tion target plotted against the actual rate of inflation
in Germany calculated as the change in the CPI in
the four most recent quarters. This chart suggests
that Austria imported inflation from Germany during
the two peaks in German inflation, the first in 1975
and the second in 1982. German inflation influenced
Austrian monetary policy through the exchange
rate because e–e ∼ tended to be negative when
German inflation was high. Figure 3 presents the
model-implied exchange rate target, e ∼, and the
actual exchange rate.7 In studying Figure 3, one
must keep the scale in mind because the schilling
fluctuated in a relatively narrow band throughout
these 20 years. For most of the period, the exchange
rate gap was negligible; therefore, Austrian monetary
policy focused on keeping its inflation rate close to
π0, which Austrian policymakers had chosen to be
close to Germany’s inflation target. Nevertheless,
the magnitude and significance of the feedback
coefficients on exchange rate gaps, λ2 in Table 1,
indicate that Austrian monetary policy remained
poised to act decisively to close any exchange rate
gap that developed.
The Model of Peg Mechanics Applied
to Thailand
Among the East Asian countries that were
forced to break an exchange rate peg between 1997
and 1998, Thailand was the first, and perhaps the
most surprising, to devalue. Prior to 1997, Thailand
had maintained one of the tightest and most long-
standing pegs in Asia. To understand the mechanics
behind Thailand’s peg of the Thai baht to the U.S.
dollar, we estimate equation (3) for Thailand and
compare the results with Austria. As with Austria,
we used the three-month interest rate and the CPI
along with the exchange rate. For Thailand, however,
we used monthly data from January 1990 through
June 1997, one month before the peg was broken. 
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates: these
show that Thailand’s baseline inflation rate, π0t,
had an unconditional probability-weighted value
of 6.5, which is well above the average level of U.S.
inflation for that period, 3.1 percent. Hence the only
way that Thailand’s period-by-period inflation target
could remain close to the U.S. rate would be through
feedback from the inflation and exchange rate gaps.
In contrast, Austria’s baseline inflation rate closely
matched the corresponding rate in Germany. Figure
4 shows that Thailand’s inflation rate consistently
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Rateexceeded the inflation rate in the United States, but
by less than 3.4 percent (6.5–3.1), because of feed-
back from the inflation gap. Parameters p2 and q2
are the transition probabilities for switching in the
feedback coefficients, λ1 and γ2, and both show
very little persistence. In fact, since p2+q2<1, the
feedback coefficients show negative serial correla-
tion, which implies oscillatory behavior in the
period-by-period inflation target,
(5)
For Thailand, the feedback coefficients λ1b and λ2b
imply strong responses to inflation and exchange
rate gaps. For Austria, the feedback coefficients
display no serial correlation—either positive or
negative—because p2+q2 is essentially equal to
one; moreover, feedback from the gaps does not
play an important role in determining Austria’s
interest rate.
Figure 5 shows that—after 1995 especially—
Thailand’s period-by-period inflation target, which
is conditional on feedback from the gaps, appears
to inherit negative serial correlation from switch-
ing in the feedback coefficients. Figure 6 plots the
posterior probability of the high-feedback state
and confirms that the fluctuation in the probability
from month to month went from a relatively narrow
range, between 30 percent and 60 percent prior to
mid-1995, to a much greater range thereafter.8 The
πλ π π λ 01 1 2 1 tt
US
t t t ee −− () −− ()
− − ˜ .
discussion that follows centers on why Thailand’s
policy feedback coefficients became more volatile
starting in mid-1995.
The exchange value of the U.S. dollar—to which
the baht was pegged—reached a record low in May
1995 against the Japanese yen, at which time the
dollar was also weak against other major currencies.
Prior to May 1995, the dollar had depreciated con-
sistently against the yen since early 1990 (as shown
in Figure 7). Since Japan is both a major trading
partner and a rival exporter with Thailand, the baht-
dollar peg was able to sustain a rising real exchange
rate with the dollar during the period that the yen
was appreciating against the dollar.9 In May 1995,
however, the dollar-yen exchange rate peaked and
the real exchange value of the yen began to depre-
ciate against the dollar. To remain competitive in
international markets, Thailand felt compelled at
this juncture to prevent further appreciation of the
real exchange value of the baht relative to the dollar.
Clearly, it would have been difficult for Thailand
if the real exchange value of the baht had been
expected to continue to increase relative to the
52 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001
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8 The posterior probability is the probability of a state at time t condi-
tional on the data up to and including time t.
9 The real exchange rate rises for Thailand if the inflation rate is greater
in Thailand than in the United States and the nominal exchange
rate (expressed in baht per dollar) does not increase by an equal
magnitude.
Figure 4
Year-Over-Year Inflation Rates of Thailand
and the United States











Parameter Estimates for Thailand
Monthly Data 1990:01 to 1997:06
π0a,b 3.863 (2.102) 15.426 (3.882)
p1, q1 0.851 (0.139) 0.501 (0.018)
λ 1a,b 0 1.415 (1.422)
λ 2a,b 0 1.022 (0.532)
δa,b 0.514 (0.074) 1
p2, q2 0.253 (0.368) 0.429 (0.264)
σ
2
a,b 2.917 (26.8) 2.993 (0.889)
p3, q3 0.207 (1.216) 0.998 (0.163)
1/n 0
Log-likelihood –197.1
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses; p1, q1 are transition
probabilities for switching in π0; p2, q2 are transition probabili-
ties for switching in λ1, λ2, δ; p3, q3 are transition probabilities
for switching in σ
2.dollar at a time when the real exchange value of
the dollar was rising relative to the world’s other
major currencies. 
One key aspect of the credibility of an exchange
rate peg is whether the market believes that the
pegging country’s economy remains competitive
internationally, given any appreciation of its real
exchange rate that has taken place during the peg.
Thailand’s appreciating real exchange value relative
to the dollar may have appeared sustainable during
a period when many of the world’s other major
currencies were appreciating relative to the dollar,
but not when this course reversed. For this reason,
it is not surprising that Figure 5 shows that Thailand’s
period-by-period inflation target was kept centered
on a mean closer to the U.S. inflation rate after mid-
1995. An obvious question, however, is why the
inflation target was so volatile around this lower
mean. The answer probably lies in the extreme
inflows of foreign capital that Thailand was receiving
at the time. On one hand, raising the short-term
interest rate helped to reduce domestic demand
and inflation. On the other hand, high interest rates
helped spur additional flows of foreign capital to
Thailand in search of high returns. In fact, the
amount of foreign capital that flowed to Thailand
in 1996 was massive, at a level equal to 13 percent
of GDP (Grenville, 2000, p. 6). The tension between
wanting to control domestic demand and inflation
in the short run and worrying about the conse-
quences of the huge capital inflows could explain
the apparent stop-go behavior of Thailand’s mone-
tary policy after mid-1995. Such a balancing act—
the rapid fluctuation of the feedback coefficients
after 1995, shown in Figure 6—was not a sustainable
policy for the long run. By July 1997, speculators
had broken the exchange rate peg. Halcomb and
Marshall (2000) review evidence that Thailand’s
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001      53
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
Figure 5
Thailand’s Feedback Rule
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160devaluation of the baht in July 1997 was not widely
anticipated in financial markets. They observe that
the timing of a currency crisis can be difficult to
predict, even if one knows that a peg is not on solid
footing for the long run.
In the face of such massive capital inflows, it
seems apparent in hindsight that Thailand proba-
bly should not have maintained such a hard peg.
Instead, the monetary policy authority could have
signaled by mid-1995 a greater degree of flexibility
with respect to adjusting the peg. Indeed, the Bank
of Thailand now practices inflation targeting with
a floating exchange rate (Sonakul, 2000, p. 2).
Figure 8 shows the baht-dollar exchange rate along
with the model-implied target rate, e ∼. This chart
suggests that the Bank of Thailand allowed the baht
to depreciate by about 4 percent in the 18 months
prior to July 1997. Clearly this rate of depreciation
was not enough to counteract the large interest
rate differential shown in Figure 9. The size of the
interest rate differential between Thailand and the
United States in the early part of 1995 suggested
that the Bank of Thailand might have signaled a
willingness to let the baht depreciate at a rate of
about 5 percent per year. Such a rate of expected
depreciation also might have helped alleviate the
capital inflows by discouraging domestic borrow-
ers from taking dollar-denominated loans. Instead,
the Bank of Thailand chose to defend the peg by
squeezing speculators who tried to take short posi-
tions in baht by imposing high interest rates and
pressure on domestic banks not to lend to off-shore
currency traders (Halcomb and Marshall, 2000).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our empirical results for Austria’s successful
exchange rate peg highlight the importance the
Austrian National Bank placed on consistently
maintaining Austria’s inflation rate close to that
of Germany. In so doing, Austria prevented the
real exchange value of the schilling vis-a-vis the
Deutsche mark from drifting far from its initial
value. Furthermore, the Austrian economy had
enough in common with the German economy
that the Austrian National Bank was willing to let
the real exchange value of the schilling experience
the vicissitudes in the real exchange value of the
Deutsche mark against other major currencies.
One lesson for pegging countries is that they ought
to behave like assiduous inflation targeters even
when there is no pressure on the exchange rate. The
key is that the inflation target should be the same
inflation target used in the anchor country because
the nominal exchange rate can no longer move to
correct an overvalued real exchange rate. Feedback
from the inflation and exchange rate gaps did not
appear to play an important role in Austria’s success-
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Percenttion target closely even before gaps developed. A
second lesson is to take care in choosing an anchor
currency because the major currencies experience
wide swings against one another. It makes no sense
to tie one’s currency to the dollar if the fluctuations
in the exchange value of the dollar against other
major currencies are difficult to withstand. 
Both of these lessons appear to apply to
Thailand’s peg to the U.S. dollar. The Bank of
Thailand allowed the domestic inflation rate to
exceed the U.S. inflation rate prior to mid-1995,
based on the depreciation of the U.S. dollar against
other major currencies, principally the Japanese yen.
In fact, the estimates of Thailand’s baseline inflation
rate were more than twice the average U.S. inflation
rate. If the Bank of Thailand truly had a long-term
commitment to pegging its currency to the dollar, it
would not have tried to take advantage of the depre-
ciation in the dollar against the yen by inflating. This
policy led to trouble when the U.S. dollar began to
appreciate against the yen in the second half of
1995. At this point, Thailand’s policy response to
the inflation gap between Thailand and the United
States was strong, but it was not implemented con-
sistently. The model estimates reveal unstable,
oscillatory behavior in the feedback from the infla-
tion gap, probably due to the tension between the
desire for high interest rates to control inflation
and concern for the size of the capital inflows that
high interest rates were attracting. In these circum-
stances, it would have been exceedingly difficult
for inflation in Thailand to undershoot the U.S.
inflation rate by a significant margin. The Bank of
Thailand might have fared better by announcing
gradual depreciation of the nominal exchange rate,
starting in mid-1995, before speculators began to
apply their own pressure. Since the crisis in 1997-
98, the Bank of Thailand has announced a new
inflation-targeting regime in place of an exchange
rate peg. The Bank of Thailand believes that the
new regime will be less prone to boom and bust
cycles than was the peg to the dollar (Sonakul, 2000).
Thus, Thailand is one emerging market that has
decided that it can find greater stability by promis-
ing low inflation than by promising a particular
exchange rate. Time will tell whether the disadvan-
tages of floating exchange rates to emerging markets
will weigh as heavily as Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
suggest. What is clear from the results presented
here is that Thailand’s exchange rate peg prior to
July 1997 never had the strong underpinnings that
sustained Austria’s peg to the Deutsche mark.
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUISabout the relationships among the variables. More-
over, the time-varying structure of the forecasts
allows it to adapt to structural breaks in the rela-
tionships between the dependent and explanatory
variables. 
The maximum-likelihood estimates reported
in Tables 1 and 2 are the result of estimating the
following density function, which includes three
Markov state variables denoted S1, S2, and S3,
where Yt–1 is all information available through
time t–1:
(A2)
The Student t densities are 


































The forecasts for equation (3) are taken from
a model that allows for two types of uncertainty.
The first arises from heteroscedasticity in the
error terms. This is modeled by a Markov switch-
ing process, which tries to match the persistence
of periods of high and low volatility in the data.
The second source of uncertainty arises as econ-
omic agents are obliged to infer unknown or
changing regression coefficients. 
The model generating the forecasts is
(A1)





where Rt is 0 or 1
Probability (Rt=0|Rt–1=0)=r1
Probability (Rt=1|Rt–1=1)=r2.
Variable i is the interest rate differential, π is con-
sumer price inflation, and e is the exchange rate
in logs. 
The time-varying coefficients assume that the
state variables, βt, follow a random walk process:
βt=βt–1+υt
υt ∼ Normal (0,Q).
The random walk assumption suggests that agents
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